Philosophical
responses to the problem of religious diversity
Philosophers have responded to the problem
of religious diversity in various ways. Such responses are usually grouped into
one of the following trichotomous categories: exclusivism, inclusivism, and
pluralism. One of the most contested areas in discussions of religious
diversity concerns the treatment by religions of the salvific[1] prospects of outsiders; in other words, what is the proper way
religious traditions should think of the soteriological fate of people who do
not belong to such traditions. In terms of the
exclusivist-inclusivist-pluralist trichotomy referred to above, several sorts
of responses to the problem of outsiders’ salvific prospects can be
anticipated:
· An exclusivist would argue that
salvation is only possible through his or her own religion and that outsiders
are destined to soteriologically inferior ends (i.e. hell);
·
An inclusivist would argue that
while salvation may be possible for outsiders, the inclusvist’s religion has
the most religious value and soteriological efficacy.
·
Finally, a pluralistic response
to the problem of religious diversity and more specifically, the question of
outsiders’ salvific prospects, is to say that all religions are equally valid
and effective.
Thus far, I have framed the problem of
religious diversity in soteriological terms, i.e. as regards the question of
salvation for outsiders. There is no reason to delimit the discussion in this
way, however. For example, one can deploy the exclusivist-inclusivist-pluralist
trichotomy to anticipate philosophical responses to another issue at the
forefront in discussions of religious diversity: the question of whether
outsider religious traditions contain any religious truth (both sets of issue
are, of course, closely connected). Just as you can be an exclusivist as regards the question of
outsiders’ salvific prospects, you can also be an exclusivist in connection
with the question of religious truth; an exclusivist would hold that only his
or her own religious tradition contains religious truth. Inclusivist and
pluralist responses can also be developed. In this blog post, I will try to
deal with both issues.
John
Hick’s approach to the problem of religious diversity
The renowned 20th century British
philosopher of religion, John Hick, famously argued that the most important
indicator that a religious tradition is not just a creation of the human imagination
but is instead in part a product of input from ultimate reality is that it facilitates the transformation of people from
self-centerdness to reality-centerdness. The idea that the major world religions serve as soteriological
vehicles that transform persons existentially from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness
is, I believe, a tremendously useful, accurate and insightful way to
conceptualize the function of religious traditions. It is an insight that I
feel is consistent with and expressive of the Hindu Vaishnava view and so I
will often return to it throughout the course of this post.
An additional insight of Hick’s that
readers should be aware of, but one that I have strong reservations about, is
his distinctly Kantian emphasis on ultimate reality’s utter ineffability. Hick
argued that ‘the Real’, i.e. God, is ineffable and not directly experienced by
anyone; religious believers only interact with it indirectly through personal
and impersonal appearances of the ultimate reality. Hick’s view was that
ultimate reality belongs to the noumenal realm, an area to which we have
absolutely no access. All that we can experience are phenomenal appearances of
the ultimate.
While there is much that is insightful in
Hick’s argument, undue stress on the ineffability of the divine reality
impoverishes religion of some of its most attractive and enduring features,
i.e. the effectiveness of worship and prayer, the powerful and emotional
intensity of religious experience, etc. I will return to this issue later when
we survey Hindu Vedantic views on ineffability.
Hindu
Vaishnava perspective on religious diversity
Historically, Hindu theologians have
responded in diverse ways to the question of whether members of other religious
traditions can achieve salvation or liberation (howsoever conceived) at the end
of their spiritual journeys. Such responses tend to be pluralist or inclusive
in nature. There is, of course, a very important nuance that must be borne in
mind when considering and reflecting on Hindu views in this context: the Indic
belief in reincarnation means that Hindus believe that the soteriological
process occurs over and across multiple lifetimes. In the context of the
present discussion, this means that when I speak of the salvific power of other
traditions, what I am referring to is not their ability to deliver salvation to
their members at the end of this
lifetime but rather their capacity to contribute and advance the soteriological
and existential transformation of believers in Hickean ways (i.e. by making
them less self-centered and more reality-centered).
Indeed, in the Hindu context, the question,
can non-Hindus achieve moksha or
salvation?, is (as the Buddha would say) an unprofitable question. Why? The
vast majority of Hindus will not achieve moksha
during their present lifetimes; that being the case, and given that most Hindus
would accord pride of place to their own tradition in the economy of salvation,
it goes without saying that most non-Hindus will not likely achieve moksha in their current life.
The sheer diversity and heterogeneity that characterize
Hindu traditions means that there is no one, single Hindu perspective on the
question of outsiders’ salvific prospects. To delimit the scope of this
discussion, however, I want to think theologically from a particular Hindu
perspective: that of the Hindu Vaishnava tradition. Vaishnavism sets itself apart from other traditions in Hinduism by
its monotheistic and exclusive focus on Vishnu (in any one of his forms) as
Supreme Lord and by its advocacy of devotion as an important path to liberation.
Preliminaries now aside, let us think more deeply about how Hindu Vaishnavas
can think about the soteriological fate of outsiders.
Hindu traditions have long recognized the
myriad ways in which ultimate reality can be experienced and apprehended.
Indeed, the Rig Veda famously remarks that: “the truth is one, the wise call it
by different names”. Differences in
nomenclature aside, Hindu religious traditions also recognize that different
facets of the ultimate reality appeal to aspirants depending on their own
inclinations and theological predispositions. For example, while Vaishnava
traditions choose to focus on the personal and theistic aspect of ultimate reality,
they do not deny the validity of impersonal experiences of the divine. Impersonal
traditions tend to focus on the ultimate as the ground of all being and/or as
pure consciousness rather than as a personal and omnibenevolent supreme deity. While
privileging their own conception of the divine, Vaishnavas would argue that God’s
infinite nature lends itself to be experienced in myriad ways by religious
aspirants. Further, for Vaishnava’s, God’s willingness to reciprocate with believers
in a manner suitable to their religious aspirations is but a particular
illustration of divine compassion and mercy.
An important scriptural verse in the
Vaishnava canon that informs Vaishnava views on this subject comes from the
Bhagavad Gita (Chapter 4, Verse 11): “According
to the manner in which they approach Me, I favour them in that very manner. Men
experience Me alone in different ways, O Arjuna” In my reading, this
verse brings out quite beautifully the all-embracing nature of divine love.
Krishna makes clear here that he “meets every aspirant with favour and grants
to each his heart’s desire” It seems quite obvious to me that this reading of the text
precludes Hindu Vaishnavas from adopting exclusivist approaches to the question
of outsiders’ salvific prospects. God responds with favour to religious
aspirants regardless of the way in which they worship or approach him. To link
this discussion back to Hick’s understanding of religion’s function, I want to
suggest that this verse opens up interpretive possibilities for Hindu Vaishnavas
to think about other world religions as representing important soteriological vehicles that transform persons
existentially from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.
Given the many-lifetimes approach that
Hinduism takes to the question of liberation, my response to the problem of religious
diversity is to suggest that religious aspirants from all major world
traditions can and do make soteriological progress when they practice their
religion. This means that, contrary to what some religious traditions argue,
there is no reason to think that believers from other world religions are
destined for everlasting punishment just for choosing to conceive of the divine
in different ways. Of course, an important qualification here is in order. The
Hindu Vaishnava view does not require that one hold all religions to be equally salvific. All major world
religions, allow their adherents to get a keener insight into the nature of
reality or God and to adopt dispositional attitudes towards that reality that
are life-transforming and soteriologically effective. My view is that this
position still creates sufficient room for one to argue that a particular
religion or tradition is more effective (vis-à-vis others) in bringing about
the sorts of existential transformations that make believers more
reality-centered. In sum, the view I have been articulating above does not
require believers to hold all religions to be equally true; it does however
require that we see all religions as valid (for the reasons described above).
The fact that God’s nature is infinite and
that he has the capacity to assume multiple manifestations according to the
wishes of his devotees, does not mean that all religious approaches or paths
are equally valid. In an important part of the Gita, Krishna speaks of some
religious paths as being avidhi purvakam,
i.e. contrary to regulative religious principles. However, far from
delegitimizing such religious practices and rejecting the worship offered,
Krishna makes clear that even in such cases he strengthens the devotees faith
in their chosen deity and dispenses himself the gift or material goods sought.
This is a striking example of Krishna’s universal benevolence and love for all
people.
I decided to frame this discussion early on
in the context of Hinduism’s reincarnation thesis: that human beings’ spiritual
journey occurs across multiple lifetimes and in the contexts of different
successive bodily existences. Without losing sight of this larger context, let
us think of a slightly different question: can believers of other religious traditions
attain moksha or liberation in their present lifetime?
Most classical Hindu theologians, I think,
would respond in the negative to this question: they would suggest that while
religious progress is possible in other traditions, the culmination of the
soteriological process would require birth in a particular Hindu tradition. On
this view, Hinduism must be accorded pride of place in the economy of salvation
and so moksha is only possible for Hindus. This is a view with which I agree
and one that, in my understanding, best reflects what the Hindu Vaishnava
scriptural canon has to say on the subject.
Tying this all together, my view is that
while non-Hindu traditions do not likely provide distinct full-fledged routes
to salvation, they are not lacking in usefulness in this area, and they can
play a contributing role by, for example, removing obstacles to salvation,
providing preliminary or preparatory training or useful encouragement.
Importantly, I must emphasize that there are no grounds to dogmatize here for
indeed a Hindu cannot be certain that members of other religions cannot achieve
moksha or salvation at the end of their present lifetime. In any event, all
that I have said above demonstrates, I think, that it only requires a bit of
imagination and constructive theology to see how it is entirely possible for
Hindus to hold that other religious traditions hold important, divinely
inspired insights into the nature of ultimate reality.
The
Value of Interreligious Dialogue
One of the biggest problems with exclusivist
responses to the issue of religious diversity, is that it renders interreligious
dialogue obsolete. If you truly believe that your own tradition represents the
only valid way of approaching and worshipping the divine then what need is
there to engage in interreligious dialogue. My view therefore is that for
interreligious dialogue to be a truly meaningful enterprise, the discourse it
generates must be rooted in the following premises: a) a belief that no one
religion has a monopoly on religious truth; and b) the primary objective of
interreligious dialogue is to allow interlocutors to learn from other religious
traditions and not just about such traditions. In other words, both premises
require that a participant in interreligious dialogue not be an exclusivist as
regards matters of truth; he or she must hold that other traditions hold truths
of their own and that we can learn
something from them.
My view is that Hindu Vaishnavas can argue,
without contradiction or inconsistency, that their particular tradition is more
effective than others in bringing about the sorts of existential
transformations that make believers more reality-centered while continuing to
believe in the value of interreligious dialogue as a means by which to learn from
(and not just about) other traditions. I can see how my argument may be
perceived to be vulnerable to the criticism that it doesn’t really permit for
genuine interreligious dialogue since a Vaishnava Hindu, on this account, would
have little to gain or learn from other traditions given that his or her own
tradition represents a soteriologically more effective approach to the divine
reality. I’ll leave it for readers to consider the extent to which this
criticism holds but I would like to argue that in my own experience, at least,
the perceived inconsistency is apparent only. To experience the divine in all
its glory and richness, if such a thing is indeed possible, dialogue across
religions is not only desirable but necessary. The point is to learn from others
facets of the divine nature that one’s own tradition or understanding may not
have emphasized.
I should add that my vision of ‘learning
from others’ does not necessarily require that we be open to acquiring new or additional beliefs from
other traditions but rather that we, at least, be open to deriving from other
traditions a fresh perspective or a deeper insight into beliefs that we already
hold.
My study of Hinduism leads me to believe that
there are sufficient conceptual resources within Hindu Vaishnavism that justify
an approach that treats other religious traditions as valid. One such resource
is of course the verse from the Bhagavad Gita to which I have already made
reference. Other resources include: (i) the Vedantic insistence on the
ineffability of the ultimate; and (ii) the notion of divine revelation.
The ineffable nature of the divine is a
natural corollary of God’s infinite and transcendent nature. The Vedanta
tradition within Hinduism cautions students that our sensorial and cognitive
capacities, including the language we use and study and that of the Vedas, cannot provide us with unmediated
and complete access to the divine reality, howsoever conceptualized. In the
context of this discussion, this means that religious traditions, by
implication, are but provisional attempts at conceptualizing ultimate reality
in ways understandable to religious believers. It seems to me that this recognition
of God’s ineffable nature provides a promising basis upon which theological dialogue
across and between religions can take place. It requires a degree of
theological humility on the part of believers across traditions as they
recognize that no one tradition can claim a monopoly on conceptualizations of
the divine.
I argued earlier that undue stress on the
ineffability of the divine reality impoverishes religion of some of its most
attractive and enduring features. I want to argue also that ineffability is
also a problem for interreligious dialogue. The reason that I don’t want to
stress God’s utter inaccessibility to the believer’s imagination is because it
would render unintelligible and meaningless any dialogue between religious
traditions; after all what exactly is it we would be talking about? If God is
so beyond human discourse then all we are really doing is grasping, in the
dark, at an unknown realm, to which we have no access and from which we receive
no illumination. While some traditions do stress the entirely noumenal nature
of ultimate reality, most religious believers would not conceive of their
relationship with and understanding of ultimate reality in such religiously
unsatisfying ways. Central, therefore, to the coherence of my account is the
view that we can speak meaningfully about ultimate reality and that the
ineffability of ultimate reality does not preclude soteriologically valuable
reflection and meditation on God.
To nuance this discussion further, while
religious traditions accept that God exceeds human understanding, most
traditions believe that God aids human understanding of his nature by
intervening in human history either through the form of his written revelation
(i.e. the Qu’ran or the Bible) or through the medium of divine incarnation
(i.e. Krishna or Jesus). Divine disclosure as understood in these different
traditions enables believers from different traditions to ‘compare notes’, as
it were, and to learn from each other the various ways in which God has chosen
to manifest or disclose himself. My view is that this still allows us to
privilege certain forms of divine revelation over others (in the sense that
some can be more complete than others) but at least it forces us to take
seriously the claims of other believers as regards their understanding of God
through his manifestation in their traditions.
There seems nothing within Hindu
Vaishnavism that precludes Vaishnavas from accepting the validity of divine
revelation in other religious traditions. From all that we know of God’s
omnipotence and omnibenovelence, why must we insist that it was not possible
for God to reveal himself (through various mediums) to human communities in
other parts of the world. Indeed, I would argue that the richness of God’s
nature requires that we accept revelation as pluriform in nature. We can argue
that the same divine reality has always been active towards mankind and the
differences in religious traditions are, in part, a result of or related to
differences in human circumstances. Our differing ethnic, geographical,
economic, sociological and historical circumstances have resulted in existing
differentiations in religion and culture more generally.
From a theological perspective, all that we
need to do to accept this picture of divine revelation is to accept that the ultimate
reality is infinite in nature. Different religious traditions are all encountering
the same reality but end up expressing the experience of that reality using the
idiom and cultural imagination to which they are accustomed. Christians
understand themselves to worship a triune God, Muslims understand themselves to
worship Allah, some Hindus understand themselves to worship Krishna or Vishnu;
other Hindus believe there to be a nonpersonal religious reality. In each case,
members of these religions are dealing, in my view, with the same religious
reality, variously understood or interpreted.
I should repeat that this remains
consistent with an approach that privileges certain forms of divine revelation
over others. On this view, a Hindu Vaishnava would argue that: Vishnu’s self-communication
extends to all people; the fact that he has tempered his message in line with
the historical and cultural contexts of other people does not undermine the
argument of universal revelation.
To conclude this discussion, let us reflect
briefly on how a Hindu Vaishnava can engage in interreligious discussion. I
have tried to emphasize that the point here is not merely to learn about other
religious traditions. On this view, questions of religious ultimacy are not
paramount: by way of example, the question for a Vaishnava Hindu is not whether
the doctrine of the Trinity is supported in the Bible but whether there is
value in us thinking about the Divine as triune in nature. What sort of
religious possibilities would such an understanding open up for us and in what
ways could it be used to deepen our experience of God’s mystery and
interpersonal attributes. Similarly, a Hindu Vaishnava can reflect on the
Islamic understanding of tawhid and
the ways in which the understanding of divine unicity reflect fundamental
aspects of the divine reality.
A recognition of the
provisional legitimacy of religious practices that are expressly inferior and
not recommended can be found in the Old Testament. For example, Deuteronomy
represents the religions of non-Jews as divinely approved, even if inferior to
the religion of Israel. Deuteronomy 4:19 reads as follows: “when you look up to the heavens and see the sun, the moon, and the
stars, all the host of heaven, do not be led astray and bow down to them and
serve them, things that the Lord your God has allotted to all the peoples
everywhere under heaven” (emphasis mine). Commenting on this passage,
S. R. Driver wrote: “The God of Israel
[assigns] to every nation its objects of worship; and the veneration of the
heavenly bodies by the nations (other than Israel) forms part of his
providential order of the world.” Further, in his Anchor Bible commentary, M. Weinfeld endorses the
same explanation of the verse: “The
heavenly bodies as objects of worship were assigned to the nations by God
himself”.
Nation as Mother: And Other Visions of Nationhood by Sugata Bose
