Wednesday, 26 June 2013

Advaita & Visistadvaita (Part II)

For Part I, please see here: Advaita & Visistadvaita (Part I)

The Doctrine of Nirguna Brahman

One issue that has distinguished Advaita Vedanta from many of its rival schools centers around the question of Brahman’s nature: more specifically, the main question for discussion here is whether Brahman is devoid of all attributes and qualifications (nirguna Brahman) or whether it is in fact possessed of a whole host of auspicious qualities (saguna Brahman). The debate is essentially one of an exegetical nature since it focuses primarily on the correct and proper interpretation of the sacred scriptures. We deal first with Sankara’s articulation of the nature of Brahman.

Advaita

Central to the Advaita Vedanta metaphysic is its conception of Brahman as devoid of form, qualities, and qualifications. This unsullied nature of Brahman is revealed through the employment of a complex and sophisticated apophatic theology that attempts to interpret scripture as putting forth the view of Brahman as free from all (auspicious and non-auspicious) characteristics.

Sankara is forced however to admit the existence of a multitude of scriptural statements which describe Brahman as possessing form and qualities. He argues that this is necessary because it is possible to relate to Brahman only from the empirical level. The Absolute is thus spoken of as two according to whether it is from the transcendental level (nirguna) or the relative, worldly (saguna). They are also referred to as para Brahman (higher Brahman) and apara Brahman (lower Brahman), respectively, and correspond to the acosmic and cosmic aspects of the Reality. Saguna Brahman, also known as Isvara, is for all practical purposes important as the cause and controller of the universe, and as God of religion. Form and attributes are essential in worship and meditation.

Visistadvaita

According to Sri Ramanuja, the most influential exponent of Visistadvaita philosophy, Brahman is qualified by cit (souls) and acit (matter) and possessed of an infinite number of auspicious qualities. Those Upanisadic statements that appear to postulate a nirguna Brahman are regarded by Ramanuja (and all major Vaishnava Vedantists following him) as having as their purport the negation of all material qualities (prakritiguna) and/or all inauspicious qualities (amangala guna).

One of the most controversial issues in Vedantic hermeneutics concerns the question of whether any of the scriptural texts can convey an impartite and non-relational sense (akhandartha). The question typically arises in connection with the interpretation of the Upanisadic text, ‘Satyam Jnanam Ananatam Brahman’ which provides the definition of Brahman as ‘Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude’. These three terms, according to Sankara, denote the very svarupa or essence of Brahman and they are not to be taken as its attributes. Accordingly, this Upanisadic text is understood, by Sankara, to mean that Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, and Infinitude and not that it is possessed of these three characteristics. This is technically known as akhandartha or that which conveys an impartite, non-relational sense. On the basis of such a view it is contended that Brahman is devoid of all characteristics.

This interpretation is seriously questioned both by Ramanuja and Madhva. According to them, the three terms stand for the distinguishing attributes of Brahman. In a statement where the terms stand in apposition (samanadhikarana vakya) the terms which connote distinctive qualities denote one entity as qualified by those qualities. This is the explanation offered by the grammarian, which Ramanuja has adopted to interpret the co-ordinate judgments. If this statement is taken as a sentence offering a definition, Brahman is defined in terms of its distinguishing characteristics. It is not, therefore, possible, argues Ramanuja, to assert on the basis of this text that Brahman is nirvisesa or devoid of qualification. [Please note: these notes are taken from S.M. Srinivasa Chari, The Philosophy of the Vedantasutra: A study based on the evaluation of the commentaries of Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhva, 2010]

Monday, 24 June 2013

Advaita & Visistadvaita (Part I)


In my next series of posts I will be providing an overview of a number of differences that separate Advaita Vedanta from Visistadvaita Vedanta. My intention is to focus on those issues that have received most coverage in the polemical literature of both schools. So as to expand the scope of this endeavor, I will also include the views of other Vaisnava schools where, I feel, their views contribute something useful to the debate. Importantly, I do not intend for this piece and the posts that follow to be comprehensive; such an achievement would not only be impossible for me (given my lack of traditional training in Sanskrit and Vedanta) but also, I figure, unattractive for my readers.

The polemical works of both camps reveal deep proficiency in the art of philosophical and theological disputation; the arguments developed by both schools were often very subtle and highly complex in nature- my objective here is simply to present these arguments in as simple and digestible a form as possible. In certain cases, where the arguments developed are overly complex, I will only provide a basic overview of the positions of both schools on the relevant issue or question without undertaking any sort of analysis of the actual arguments deployed. Following in the spirit of my earlier post, I do intend for this post and the posts that follow to be rich in analysis; my aim is to provide my readers with the views of both schools with the intention of letting them decide which view they prefer/find more compelling/more persuasive/more logical, etc.

As most students of Vedanta know, the validity of a particular school depends primarily and arguably most importantly on its conformity to the scriptural texts. The implication that flows from this basic Vedantic axiom is that where a theory or a doctrine departs fundamentally from the sacred texts it cannot, notwithstanding its otherwise logical soundness, be accepted as genuinely Vedantic in nature. A useful way of analyzing the following discussion then is to try and assess which view best represents the letter and the spirit of the sacred texts.

In terms of structure, my intention is to follow the basic approach of Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani; I hope to be able to cover the following issues/questions: the nature of consciousness; the nature of the individual self; the doctrine of nirguna Brahman; sadhana; and mukti. I intend to rely heavily on Dr. S.M. Srinivasa Chari’s translation and introduction to the aforementioned text. This write-up is based on my personal notes taken from a variety of sources (see below). Where possible, I will refer to the source of my notes at the end of the relevant section- readers interested in the subject-matter would be well-advised to consult these texts for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the relevant issues.

The following texts will be utilized.
  1. S.M. Srinivasa Chari, Advaita & Visistadvaita: A study based on Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani, 2004
  2. S.M. Srinivasa Chari, The Philosophy of the Vedantasutra: A study based on the evaluation of the commentaries of Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhva, 2010
  3. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 & 2 & 3, 1975
  4. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 & 2, 1923
  5. S. Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedanta: Selections from Sankara’s Writings, 2011
  6. Swami Vireswarananda, Brahma Sutras: According to Sri Sankara, 1978
  7. Swami Vireswarananda & Swami Adidevananda, Brahma Sutras: According to Sri Ramanuja, 1978

The Nature of Consciousness

The question of the nature of consciousness raises a number of issues that could and typically are addressed separately. In this post, I want to focus on just one question: Is consciousness identical with the self? The Advaitin argues that it is. 

Advaita

According to Advaita Vedanta consciousness is an independent and eternally existing reality. It is pure contentless knowledge, which is neither produced nor destroyed. It manifests everything else but is itself not manifested by any other entity (svayamprakasa). Such knowledge is identical with the Reality. It is, in other words, Brahman itself. The consciousness that is apparent in the usual distinction of knower, known and knowledge is not real but is only empirical (vyavaharika). It is the psychosis of the inner organ (antahkarana vrtti) and is regarded as knowledge because of its being a determinant of consciousness.

Visistadvaita

The Visistadvaitins agree with the Advaitins that consciousness is unique in that it does not require anything else to establish its existence (svatah siddha). But they differ from them in denying that the true self may be understood simply as consciousness. Were that the case, selves could not be individuals. Rather, intentional consciousness is an essential property of individual selves that are its agent and substrate. It is the true self that is revealed as the ‘I’ in every conscious state. Distinctively Visistadvaitin is the idea that the self both has the form of consciousness (cid-rupa) and has consciousness as its quality. They say that consciousness is both substance (dravya) and an attribute (guna) and its nature is to render entities susceptible of thought, speech and action. As the essential property of the soul, it can be considered as substance, but as discrete mental acts possessed by the self, it exists as an attribute. [Please note: these notes are taken from S.M. Srinivasa Chari, Advaita & Visistadvaita: A study based on Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani, 2004]

The Nature of the Individual Self

Here my aim is to explore the different views offered in response to the following question: what is the self (jivatman)?

Advaita

How does Advaita Vedanta understand the position and nature of the jiva? According to Sankara, it is Brahman (the Absolute Self)which appears as the plurality of individual souls, due to avidya (nescience) superimposed on the immutable consciousness. So, essentially, the individual Self (atman) and the Absolute Self are one and the same. This identity is revealed when the ignorance that causes this superimposition is dispelled by knowledge of one’s essential nature as the Self within. Brahman appears as the multiplicity of souls due to name and form, which are latent in avidya, and so, in truth, birth and death relate only to the body. It is only the adjuncts (upadhis) that create a distinct individuality, and are also responsible for transmigration, till the nescience- which is responsible for the mistaken identity- is dispelled through knowledge.

Plurality of the individual souls is only an appearance that arises due to avidya, according to Sankara. It is the non-dual Absolute Self that appears like innumerable jivas, like the one sun which, when reflected in several water bodies, is seen as countless suns. Each reflection of the sun is distinct in a particular lake or pond, and this is due to that particular water body (adjunct). So also, is each jiva different due to the adjuncts of the body and mind, which differ in each individual soul. This theory is known as bimba-pratibimba-vada. Another example cited in scriptural texts to explain the phenomenon of the non-dual Self appearing as several jivas is that of the restriction of space in jars. Space being all-pervasive, it seems confined inside each jar, thereby appearing different. So, it is the adjuncts that give rise to the sense of individuality and plurality of the souls. This latter theory is known as avaccheda-vada. [Please note: these notes are taken from S. Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedanta: Selections from Sankara’s Writings, 2011]

Visistadvaita

Ramanuja’s understanding of the self or jivatman differs markedly from that of Sankara’s. He ‘wages a rigorous and telling polemic against those who regard persons or individuals as vain variations of the self-same absolute.’ (Radhakrishnan) The individual soul, though a mode (prakara) of the supreme, is real, unique, eternal, endowed with intelligence and self-consciousness, unchanging, imperceptible and atomic. It is the knower (jnata), the agent (karta) and the enjoyer (bhokta).

The jiva is not one with God, since it differs in essential character from him. It is said to be a part (amsa) of Brahman. Though it cannot be a part cut out of the whole since Brahman admits of no divisions, yet it is comprised within the universal self. Ramanuja says that the souls are parts in the sense of visesanas, qualified forms or modes of Brahman. A useful introduction to Ramanuja’s doctrine of the jiva can be found in his commentary to II.3.43 of the Vedanta Sutra (amso nana vyapadesat anyatha ca’pi dasakitavaditvam adhiyata eke). Before I go on to explore Ramanuja’s understanding of the verse, I will try and shed some light on the way in which Sankara interprets this verse. The term amsa in the sutra is intended to explain the nature of the jiva’s relation to Brahman. The commentators differ in their understanding of this critical term. The term, itself, literally means a part. However, since Brahman is niravayava or partless, it is difficult to conceive how jiva can be part of it. Sankara understands the term and the verse of which it forms a part in the following way.

According to him (and this is a recapitulation of the above) the jiva is identical with Brahman and it cannot therefore by said to be a part of Brahman. It only appears to be different from Brahman owing to its imaginary association with physical adjuncts. In order to fit in with this metaphysical doctrine, Sankara interprets the term amsa as amsa iva, that is, it appears as if it were a part. In this sense the relationship between the two is analogous to fire and the sparks emanating from fire. The upshot here is that the jiva is not a distinct real ontological entity but it is one with Brahman.

How then does Sankara account for those scriptural texts that admit of a difference between the jiva and Brahman? Here, it is necessary to introduce the two-tiered understanding of reality that Sankara expounds in his works. According to Sankara, the Upanishads have as their purport the identity of the individual self with the Brahman. However, he acknowledges the existence of certain scriptural statements which appear to distinguish between the individual self and Brahman; in order to deal with these somewhat inconvenient statements, Sankara develops a complex hermeneutical strategy wherein he distinguishes between two perspectives on reality: the absolute perspective (paramarthika) and the empirical perspective (vyavaharika). Sankara recognizes that ‘a blanket assertion of identity will be difficult to swallow as the subject-object distinction in the process of knowledge will become obliterated.’

At the empirical level, bondage and the suffering entailed by it are undeniable facets of our life experience; dismissing them as unreal or illusory is to deny and to distort our basic and foundational understanding of our experiences. When Sankara states that the jiva or individual is an illusion- the effect of avidya- it is to be understood from the absolute perspective (paramarthika). Sankara acknowledges that all worldly phenomena are real at the empirical or vyavaharika level. It is only when the knowledge of the identity of the individual self and the absolute self becomes known through the teachings of the sacred texts that the primordial avidya, which created the illusion of plurality, gets obliterated, and the non-dual nature of the Reality becomes a fact of experience. So, from the absolute standpoint, the individual is an illusion. All scriptural statements that speak of difference between the jiva and Brahman pertain only to the empirical level of reality and are therefore only provisionally true; as a result they are sublated by those texts that affirm identity since.

This digression complete let me now turn to Ramanuja’s doctrine of the self as encapsulated in his commentary on the aforementioned Vedanta Sutra text (II.3.43 of the Vedanta Sutra (amso nana vyapadesat anyatha ca’pi dasakitavaditvam adhiyata eke). In contrast to Sankara who construes the term amsa so as to read ‘it appears as if it were a part’, Ramanuja understands the term in its direct sense as denoting the self as part of Brahman. The word ‘part’ is not understood as corporal or divisible part of a whole entity, since Brahman is indivisible. He therefore explains the term in his comment on a later sutra (II.3.45) that amsa means an integral part of one entity (ekavastu ekadesatvam). By way of clarification, Ramanuja argues that amsa is an essential attribute (visesana) of a qualified substance (visistasya ekavastunah visesanam amsa eva). A substance as a qualified entity is inseparably related to its essential attribute similar to the sun and its rays. This relationship between the two is known as amsa-amsi bhava or visesana-visesya bhava. Ramanuja’s theory usefully allows for both difference and non-difference from different standpoints. The individual soul and Brahman are different by virtue of their intrinsic nature like the substance and its attribute but they can also be non-different or one as Brahman integrally related to the soul similar to the substance as inherently related to its attribute is one.

For Ramanuja, the souls are regarded as the effects of Brahman, since they cannot exist apart from him, and yet they are not produced effects, as ether and the like. The essential nature of the soul does not alter. The change of state it undergoes relates to the contraction and expansion of intelligence or consciousness (dharma-bhuta-jnana), while the changes on which the production, e.g. of either, depend are changes of essential nature.

Sunday, 2 June 2013

The Nature of the Universe and the Doctrine of Causation: Systems of Vedanta Compared


Every system of Vedanta has to confront the foundational problem of the relationship between Brahman and the material world. The world, with its phenomenal diversity and inherent imperfection appears to stand in stark contrast to the pure, complete and unsullied character of Brahman. How can that which is infinitely sacred and complete be associated with the finitude and profanity of the material world? The subject of the relationship between Brahman and the world constitutes a critical topic in the realm of Vedanta and the issues and questions that it engenders have been addressed divergently by different schools of Vedantic thought. My intention in the following few paragraphs is to explore the answers offered by the traditional schools to this important and foundational question. Is it, for example, the case that the world is inseparably connected to Brahman thereby potentially implicating the latter in the evils inherent in the former? Or is there, instead, an unbridgeable gulf between the world and the absolute reality, which then, of course, begs the question as to whether this strident dualism injures the declared integrity and unity of Brahman.

My intention here is to provide a very brief summary of the various schools without engaging in any critical analysis. An attempt at a critique of the various schools will be made subsequently. Each of the views offered in the following sections receive some support from scripture; indeed, each of the major theologians of the various schools have sought to uphold their own causation theories on the basis of the Prasthantrayi (the three fundamental texts on which Vedanta is based, i.e. the Upanisads, the Brahma-Sutra and the Bhagavad Gita). However, it is my view and that of many reputable scholars, that despite the elegance with which the theory is propounded, the Vivartavada of Adi Sankara constitutions an egregious misrepresentation of the foundational scriptural texts and can therefore not be accepted as being in strict conformity with scripture. This does not, in any way however, detract from its significance as a philosophical account.

What follows, then, are very basic summaries of the positions of four Vedantic schools on the question of the relationship between Brahman and the world. My summaries are essentially personal embellishments of notes extracted from the following sources: 1) The Roots of Vedanta, Selections from Sankara’s Writings, S. Rangaswami; 2) Advaita and Visisitadvaita, A study based on Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani, S.M.S. Chari; 3) The Philosophy and Religion of Sri Caitanya, O.B.L. Kapoor; 4) Philosophical Foundation of Bengal Vaisnavism, S.C. Chakravarti.

Advaita Vedanta

Adi Sankara with his disciples
According to Advaita Vedanta, the world constitutes an illusory appearance that emanates from Brahman. Notwithstanding its empirical reality, the world is ultimately unreal. The theory of material causality of Brahman, it is argued, supports the view of the universe as unreal. Like other Vedanta systems, the Advaitins interpret the Upanisads as putting forth the view of Brahman as both the material cause (upadana karana) and instrumental cause (nimmita karana) of the universe. This material causality of Brahman, however, would only be intelligible, the Advaitin argues, if the universe is regarded as illusory. Let us explore this argument in greater detail.

The doctrine of the immutability of Brahman seems to permeate many of the scriptural texts. To say that Brahman is immutable is simply to suggest that it does not and cannot undergo any transformation. The doctrine of the immutability of Brahman, then, seems to problematize the Brahmaparinamavada (the doctrine of the transformation of Brahman) of Yadava Prakasa, which entails the proposition that Brahman itself transforms into the universe just, as a lump of clay undergoes transformation into the pot. Such a view is both rightly and widely regarded as being incompatible with basic Upanisadic philosophy. The pantheism that the doctrine entails injures the unity and immutability of Brahman and degrades its purity by imposing on it or associating with it the phenomenality of the world along with its attendant problems, miseries and evils.

According to the Advaitins, the vivartavada theory of causation (according to which the world (the effect) is an illusory transformation of Brahman (the cause)) constitutes the only effective means by which to reconcile the scriptural texts that uphold, on the one hand, the immutable nature of Brahman, while accepting, on the other, its role as the material cause of the universe. The vivartavada theory of causation postulates the world-appearance as the product of Brahman’s transformation. However, this transformation does not affect the immutability of Brahman since the effect or the world appearance is just that, an appearance and hence illusory and not strictly real. And yet, since the world-appearance has Brahman as its substrate or locus, the latter can be regarded as the material cause of the former.

By way of elucidation, the analogy of the rope appearing as the snake is provided.  The rope does not transform itself into the snake. On the contrary, it only appears as a snake due to ajnana or ignorance. The rope is regarded as the cause of the appearance of the snake in so far as it is the basis or substrate of the illusory snake. In the same way, Brahman, which is the basis or substrate of the world appearance, is said to be the material cause of this universe. Such a view accounts for the material causality of Brahman in conformity with the Upanisads, without at the same time contradicting the scriptural text referring to the immutable nature of the universe.

Visistadvaita Vedanta

Sri Ramanujacharya
The Visistadvaitins, like the Sankarites, accept Brahman as both the material cause (upadana karana) and instrumental cause (nimitta karana) of the universe. However, in contrast to the latter school, they do not regard the world as constituting an illusory transformation of Brahman. Nor do they accept the Brahmanparinamavada variant offered by Yadava Prakasa, which in their view injects into Brahman the ills and evils of the universe, thereby compromising, unacceptably, the former’s pristine and immutable character.

The material cause of the universe, according to the Visistadvaitins, is Brahman associated with cit (spirit) and acit (matter) in their subtle form (suksma cid-acid-visista-Brahma). Treating Brahman as the material cause of the universe does not affect the former’s immutability since what actually transforms, according to this view, is acit or matter which constitutes but a mode or attribute of Brahman. As the basis of acit, Brahman remains unaffected by the change.

However, the question may be raised that if Brahman as qualified by cit and acit be the material cause of the universe, causality would pertain to the latter and Brahman could not therefore consistently or coherently be regarded as the world’s material cause. The Visistadvaitins respond by arguing that, notwithstanding the fact that causality proper pertains strictly only to cit and acit, Brahman can still be regarded as the material cause of the world in so far as it is the basis of that which undergoes change (vikara-sraya). While acit or matter is the substrate of change directly, Brahman is the substrate of it only indirectly, that is through matter.

In other words, though the transformation belongs to matter (which is held to constitute the body or sarira of Brahman), it is nonetheless still possible and accurate to say that Brahman transforms in as much as it is the adhara or basis of matter. On such a view, given Brahman’s indirect relation to the substance that undergoes transformation, the creation of the universe does not entail any corresponding change in Brahman and thereby preserves its immutability.

By way of illustration, the analogy of a boy growing into a youth and a youth attaining manhood is given. The analogy indicates that the changes entailed by the transition in states such as youth, manhood, etc, pertain only to the body, while the self, which constitutes the basis or adhara of the body, is in no way affected by said changes. Nevertheless in such usage as the boy grows into a youth, the terms youth etc, are used to include the self as the latter is the basis of the body. The Visisitadvaitins argue that the causality of Brahman should be understood in the same sense, the different states involving changes do belong to Brahman and yet the immutable character of Brahman remains unaffected.

Dvaita Vedanta

Madhva’s theory of the constitution of matter and the evolution of the world is based on the Samkhya metaphysics of the Upansidas, the Epics and the Puranas. Madhva accepts the doctrine of the evolution of matter (prakriti).

Sri Madhvacharya
Madhva has stoutly opposed the attempts of other commentators on the Vedanta who have denied a place to prakriti as the material stuff out of which the universe is evolved by Brahman in the philosophy of the Vedanta. He argues for prakriti as the insentient, dependent material principle, which is the material cause (upadana karana) of the world.

Caitanya Vaishnavism

The Caitanya School of Vedanta follows rival schools of Vedanta (except that of Madhva’s) in accepting Brahman as both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. The Caitanya Vedantins postulate a peculiar form of parinamavada wherein what is transformed is not the substance, but some power of the same or some phenomenon that the latter produces. Since according to this theory the substance or root cause remains unaffected (avikrta) inspite of the real transformation of its power, it is called avikrta parinamavada (the theory of immutable transformation). Of course, the acceptance of a real transformation distinguishes this view from the Sankarite system, which postulates a theory of illusory modification (vivartavada).

Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu
Central to the Caitanya School is the concept of sakti or energy. According to the tradition, Brahman (or more accurately Bhagavan)[1] is intrinsically spiritual and exercises his spiritual power in three forms, known as svarup sakti, jiva sakti and maya sakti. Unique to the Caitanya School is its articulation of maya’s position vis-à-vis Brahman.  The tradition regards maya not as an intrinsic power (antaranga sakti) of the Absolute but as an external power (bahiranga sakti), which has no direct contact with the essentially spiritual nature of the deity.

Nonetheless, maya, being a sakti (power/energy) of Bhagavan, stands in the relation of inconceivable difference in non-difference (acintya bhedabheda) to Bhagavan who not only supports it but also transcends it. The world is not a direct transformation (parinama) of Bhagavan or Brahman, but it is regarded as such, in as much as it is a real modification of the maya-sakti, which is non-different from Bhagavan. The spiritual unity of Brahman however suffers no transformation through the transformation of the bahiranga sakti or external power into the material world of phenomenal diversity. The world is thus an effect of Brahman who is its material and efficient cause through his external power, called maya, but whose transcendental nature is never affected by that power or is modification.

This view of causation is generally known by the name avikrtaparinamavada since it recognizes the real modification (parinama) of maya, while maintaining the integrity of Brahman uninjured and unaffected. The Caitanya School of Vaishnavism regard the effect as both identical with and different from the cause and at the same time confess the inconceivability of such a relation. The view of causation as held by this school has also been described as acintyaparinamavada or the theory of inconceivable modification implying thereby that it is a mystery how the cause which is non-different from its sakti remains unaffected when the latter is actually transformed into the effect. If the world be a transformation of Bhagavan through his maya (which being his own sakti, is non different from him), it is really inconceivable how Bhagavan escapes transformation when his sakti undergoes it.

The School’s theologians cite the illustration of cintamani, a fabulous gem, which by virtue of the unthinkable power inherent in it produces various objects without undergoing any change in its own nature. It is held by such thinkers that since Bhagavan is the repository of all inscrutable power and all contradictions merge in him, there should be no doubt about the transformation of the immutable Bhagavan into the world.









[1] Brahman and Bhagavan constitute different manifestations of the one non-dual reality. Bhagavan is Brahman replete with form, energy and attributes. Brahman’s undifferentiated nature appears on account of it not possessing the aforementioned characteristics; it is, in other words, a substance without its attributes or a subject without its predicates. Notwithstanding the terminological difference, I will use the terms interchangeably here.