Advaita & Visistadvaita (Part I)

In my next series of posts I will be providing an overview of a number of differences that separate Advaita Vedanta from Visistadvaita Vedanta. My intention is to focus on those issues that have received most coverage in the polemical literature of both schools. So as to expand the scope of this endeavor, I will also include the views of other Vaisnava schools where, I feel, their views contribute something useful to the debate. Importantly, I do not intend for this piece and the posts that follow to be comprehensive; such an achievement would not only be impossible for me (given my lack of traditional training in Sanskrit and Vedanta) but also, I figure, unattractive for my readers.

The polemical works of both camps reveal deep proficiency in the art of philosophical and theological disputation; the arguments developed by both schools were often very subtle and highly complex in nature- my objective here is simply to present these arguments in as simple and digestible a form as possible. In certain cases, where the arguments developed are overly complex, I will only provide a basic overview of the positions of both schools on the relevant issue or question without undertaking any sort of analysis of the actual arguments deployed. Following in the spirit of my earlier post, I do intend for this post and the posts that follow to be rich in analysis; my aim is to provide my readers with the views of both schools with the intention of letting them decide which view they prefer/find more compelling/more persuasive/more logical, etc.

As most students of Vedanta know, the validity of a particular school depends primarily and arguably most importantly on its conformity to the scriptural texts. The implication that flows from this basic Vedantic axiom is that where a theory or a doctrine departs fundamentally from the sacred texts it cannot, notwithstanding its otherwise logical soundness, be accepted as genuinely Vedantic in nature. A useful way of analyzing the following discussion then is to try and assess which view best represents the letter and the spirit of the sacred texts.

In terms of structure, my intention is to follow the basic approach of Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani; I hope to be able to cover the following issues/questions: the nature of consciousness; the nature of the individual self; the doctrine of nirguna Brahman; sadhana; and mukti. I intend to rely heavily on Dr. S.M. Srinivasa Chari’s translation and introduction to the aforementioned text. This write-up is based on my personal notes taken from a variety of sources (see below). Where possible, I will refer to the source of my notes at the end of the relevant section- readers interested in the subject-matter would be well-advised to consult these texts for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the relevant issues.

The following texts will be utilized.

1. S.M. Srinivasa Chari, Advaita & Visistadvaita: A study based on Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani, 2004
2. S.M. Srinivasa Chari, The Philosophy of the Vedantasutra: A study based on the evaluation of the commentaries of Samkara, Ramanuja and Madhva, 2010
3. S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 & 2 & 3, 1975
4. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 & 2, 1923
5. S. Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedanta: Selections from Sankara’s Writings, 2011
6. Swami Vireswarananda, Brahma Sutras: According to Sri Sankara, 1978
7. Swami Vireswarananda & Swami Adidevananda, Brahma Sutras: According to Sri Ramanuja, 1978

The Nature of Consciousness

The question of the nature of consciousness raises a number of issues that could and typically are addressed separately. In this post, I want to focus on just one question: Is consciousness identical with the self? The Advaitin argues that it is. 

Advaita

According to Advaita Vedanta consciousness is an independent and eternally existing reality. It is pure contentless knowledge, which is neither produced nor destroyed. It manifests everything else but is itself not manifested by any other entity (svayamprakasa). Such knowledge is identical with the Reality. It is, in other words, Brahman itself. The consciousness that is apparent in the usual distinction of knower, known and knowledge is not real but is only empirical (vyavaharika). It is the psychosis of the inner organ (antahkarana vrtti) and is regarded as knowledge because of its being a determinant of consciousness.

Visistadvaita

The Visistadvaitins agree with the Advaitins that consciousness is unique in that it does not require anything else to establish its existence (svatah siddha). But they differ from them in denying that the true self may be understood simply as consciousness. Were that the case, selves could not be individuals. Rather, intentional consciousness is an essential property of individual selves that are its agent and substrate. It is the true self that is revealed as the ‘I’ in every conscious state. Distinctively Visistadvaitin is the idea that the self both has the form of consciousness (cid-rupa) and has consciousness as its quality. They say that consciousness is both substance (dravya) and an attribute (guna) and its nature is to render entities susceptible of thought, speech and action. As the essential property of the soul, it can be considered as substance, but as discrete mental acts possessed by the self, it exists as an attribute. [Please note: these notes are taken from S.M. Srinivasa Chari, Advaita & Visistadvaita: A study based on Vedanta Desika’s Satadusani, 2004]

The Nature of the Individual Self

Here my aim is to explore the different views offered in response to the following question: what is the self (jivatman)?

Advaita

How does Advaita Vedanta understand the position and nature of the jiva? According to Sankara, it is Brahman (the Absolute Self), which appears as the plurality of individual souls, due to avidya (nescience) superimposed on the immutable consciousness. So, essentially, the individual Self (atman) and the Absolute Self are one and the same. This identity is revealed when the ignorance that causes this superimposition is dispelled by knowledge of one’s essential nature as the Self within. Brahman appears as the multiplicity of souls due to name and form, which are latent in avidya, and so, in truth, birth and death relate only to the body. It is only the adjuncts (upadhis) that create a distinct individuality, and are also responsible for transmigration, till the nescience- which is responsible for the mistaken identity- is dispelled through knowledge.

Plurality of the individual souls is only an appearance that arises due to avidya, according to Sankara. It is the non-dual Absolute Self that appears like innumerable jivas, like the one sun which, when reflected in several water bodies, is seen as countless suns. Each reflection of the sun is distinct in a particular lake or pond, and this is due to that particular water body (adjunct). So also, is each jiva different due to the adjuncts of the body and mind, which differ in each individual soul. This theory is known as bimba-pratibimba-vada. Another example cited in scriptural texts to explain the phenomenon of the non-dual Self appearing as several jivas is that of the restriction of space in jars. Space being all-pervasive, it seems confined inside each jar, thereby appearing different. So, it is the adjuncts that give rise to the sense of individuality and plurality of the souls. This latter theory is known as avaccheda-vada. [Please note: these notes are taken from S. Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedanta: Selections from Sankara’s Writings, 2011]

Visistadvaita

Ramanuja’s understanding of the self or jivatman differs markedly from that of Sankara’s. He ‘wages a rigorous and telling polemic against those who regard persons or individuals as vain variations of the self-same absolute.’ (Radhakrishnan) The individual soul, though a mode (prakara) of the supreme, is real, unique, eternal, endowed with intelligence and self-consciousness, unchanging, imperceptible and atomic. It is the knower (jnata), the agent (karta) and the enjoyer (bhokta).

The jiva is not one with God, since it differs in essential character from him. It is said to be a part (amsa) of Brahman. Though it cannot be a part cut out of the whole since Brahman admits of no divisions, yet it is comprised within the universal self. Ramanuja says that the souls are parts in the sense of visesanas, qualified forms or modes of Brahman. A useful introduction to Ramanuja’s doctrine of the jiva can be found in his commentary to II.3.43 of the Vedanta Sutra (amso nana vyapadesat anyatha ca’pi dasakitavaditvam adhiyata eke). Before I go on to explore Ramanuja’s understanding of the verse, I will try and shed some light on the way in which Sankara interprets this verse. The term amsa in the sutra is intended to explain the nature of the jiva’s relation to Brahman. The commentators differ in their understanding of this critical term. The term, itself, literally means a part. However, since Brahman is niravayava or partless, it is difficult to conceive how jiva can be part of it. Sankara understands the term and the verse of which it forms a part in the following way.

According to him (and this is a recapitulation of the above) the jiva is identical with Brahman and it cannot therefore by said to be a part of Brahman. It only appears to be different from Brahman owing to its imaginary association with physical adjuncts. In order to fit in with this metaphysical doctrine, Sankara interprets the term amsa as amsa iva, that is, it appears as if it were a part. In this sense the relationship between the two is analogous to fire and the sparks emanating from fire. The upshot here is that the jiva is not a distinct real ontological entity but it is one with Brahman.

How then does Sankara account for those scriptural texts that admit of a difference between the jiva and Brahman? Here, it is necessary to introduce the two-tiered understanding of reality that Sankara expounds in his works. According to Sankara, the Upanishads have as their purport the identity of the individual self with the Brahman. However, he acknowledges the existence of certain scriptural statements which appear to distinguish between the individual self and Brahman; in order to deal with these somewhat inconvenient statements, Sankara develops a complex hermeneutical strategy wherein he distinguishes between two perspectives on reality: the absolute perspective (paramarthika) and the empirical perspective (vyavaharika). Sankara recognizes that ‘a blanket assertion of identity will be difficult to swallow as the subject-object distinction in the process of knowledge will become obliterated.’

At the empirical level, bondage and the suffering entailed by it are undeniable facets of our life experience; dismissing them as unreal or illusory is to deny and to distort our basic and foundational understanding of our experiences. When Sankara states that the jiva or individual is an illusion- the effect of avidya- it is to be understood from the absolute perspective (paramarthika). Sankara acknowledges that all worldly phenomena are real at the empirical or vyavaharika level. It is only when the knowledge of the identity of the individual self and the absolute self becomes known through the teachings of the sacred texts that the primordial avidya, which created the illusion of plurality, gets obliterated, and the non-dual nature of the Reality becomes a fact of experience. So, from the absolute standpoint, the individual is an illusion. All scriptural statements that speak of difference between the jiva and Brahman pertain only to the empirical level of reality and are therefore only provisionally true; as a result they are sublated by those texts that affirm identity since.

This digression complete let me now turn to Ramanuja’s doctrine of the self as encapsulated in his commentary on the aforementioned Vedanta Sutra text (II.3.43 of the Vedanta Sutra (amso nana vyapadesat anyatha ca’pi dasakitavaditvam adhiyata eke). In contrast to Sankara who construes the term amsa so as to read ‘it appears as if it were a part’, Ramanuja understands the term in its direct sense as denoting the self as part of Brahman. The word ‘part’ is not understood as corporal or divisible part of a whole entity, since Brahman is indivisible. He therefore explains the term in his comment on a later sutra (II.3.45) that amsa means an integral part of one entity (ekavastu ekadesatvam). By way of clarification, Ramanuja argues that amsa is an essential attribute (visesana) of a qualified substance (visistasya ekavastunah visesanam amsa eva). A substance as a qualified entity is inseparably related to its essential attribute similar to the sun and its rays. This relationship between the two is known as amsa-amsi bhava or visesana-visesya bhava. Ramanuja’s theory usefully allows for both difference and non-difference from different standpoints. The individual soul and Brahman are different by virtue of their intrinsic nature like the substance and its attribute but they can also be non-different or one as Brahman integrally related to the soul similar to the substance as inherently related to its attribute is one.

For Ramanuja, the souls are regarded as the effects of Brahman, since they cannot exist apart from him, and yet they are not produced effects, as ether and the like. The essential nature of the soul does not alter. The change of state it undergoes relates to the contraction and expansion of intelligence or consciousness (dharma-bhuta-jnana), while the changes on which the production, e.g. of either, depend are changes of essential nature.